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Japan faces new security challenges due to the rise of 
China, the potential nuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, and the distraction of the United States forces 
caused by the “War on Terror”.  This will mean that, 
increasingly, Japan must take care of its own defense 
requirements.  Unfortunately, this will not be an easy 
transition for a country with a past of militarism and 
colonial expansion, an aversion to nuclear weapons, and a 
political structure that has purposely limited the role and 
resources of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).  This 
thesis examines the legacies of the past – militarism, 
colonialism, the aversion to nuclear weapons, and the 
political structure that emerged after 1945, and assesses 
how those legacies impact the adaptation of the JSDF to the 
new security requirements of the 21st Century.  The basic 
conclusion is that Japan needs to emerge from under the 
security umbrella of the United States and become a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis provides a historical review of three 
legacies that will affect the future development of the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces as a regional power.  Japan 
faces new security challenges due to the rise of China, the 
potential nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the 
distraction of the United States forces caused by the “War 
on Terror”.  This will mean that, increasingly, Japan must 
take care of its own defense requirements.  Unfortunately, 
this will not be an easy transition for a country with a 
past of militarism and colonial expansion, an aversion to 
nuclear weapons, and a political structure that has 
purposely limited the role and resources of the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).  This thesis will examine the 
legacies of the past – militarism, colonialism, the 
aversion to nuclear weapons, and the political structure 
that emerged after 1945, and assess how those legacies 
impact the adaptation of the JSDF to the new security 
requirements of the 21st Century. 
A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
There are three reasons for Japan to become more 
involved in the security and defense of the East Asian 
region.  The first is China's emergence as an economic 
power which has allowed Beijing to devote more resources to 
building up their military power.  The second factor is the 
erratic behavior of North Korea and the nuclear threat 
which it poses.  Finally, the recent war in Iraq and the 
continuing "War on Terror" have forced the United States to 
commit major forces to the Middle East and elsewhere around 
the globe.  This is evident in that troop strength on the 
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Korean Peninsula is being reduced at a time of major 
tensions there.  These three factors challenge Japan's 
traditional reliance on the United States for its security.  
Japan must be prepared to defend its Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOCs) which are vital to its trade and 
prosperity.  Tokyo also will be required to reassess its 
aversion to a missile defense shield.  Finally, Japan may 
even be forced to consider the acquisition of nuclear arms.  
In short, Japan's practically free ride in matters of 
security is drawing to an end.  Japan must begin to 
shoulder political and military responsibilities in the 
region that equal its economic power and influence.  The 
major questions that emerge are:  How have ancient legacies 
influenced past (pre-war) and present (post-war) JSDF 
development?  Should Article 9 of the Japanese constitution 
be amended?  What are current Japanese defense policies? 
What will be the future challenges for the JSDF? 
The methodology used in the research for this thesis 
consists of the following steps based on a comprehensive 
literature search of books, articles and internet based 
materials.  The history of Japan and the JSDF since the 
Meiji Restoration will be addressed, as well as the 
dislocation and distortions to Japanese institutions caused 
in the inter-war years by imperial expansion driven by 
Japanese armed forces.  The impact of the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Japan's political culture will be 
assessed.  Finally, this thesis will assess the legacy of 
the American-led reconstruction of Japan after 1945.  This 
will be used as a basis to address current Japanese 
attitudes toward its defense problems, as they relate to 
the JSDF.  It will involve a comprehensive review of 
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government reports concerning issues with the government 
and security of Japan.  Some interviews are cited to gain 
critical insight and understanding of current geopolitical 
issues concerning Japan.  The current challenges within the 
Far East region and how they might affect Japanese defense 
policy will also be evaluated. 
B. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter 
II will cover the history of Japanese imperialism in the 
Asian Pacific region and evaluate how that history affects 
the current decision making process in Japan with regards 
to its SDF and how the countries in the region have been 
and will be affected by past Japanese Imperialism. 
Chapter III will evaluate the Occupation Era Post-1945 
which encompasses the nuclear and reconstruction legacies.  
This chapter will focus on the Japanese constitution, 
specifically Article 9, and how it has limited the growth 
of the JSDF.  It will also review Japanese views on nuclear 
weapons and how those views affect current Japanese 
regional security decisions.  It will also give a brief 
synopsis of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) organization. 
Chapter IV will access contemporary Japanese defense 
policy and the challenges for future Japanese defense 
policies.  Also, it will analyze the impact of future 
Japanese defense policies with regards to their regional 
and global impact. 
Chapter V will summarize the findings and present 
conclusions and recommendations regarding the fact that 
Japan  needs  to  accept  a  larger portion of the regional  
4 
security role so as to free up the United States military 





 II. JAPANESE MILITARISM/IMPERIALISM 
The rise of Japanese Imperialism and its fall 
following the defeat by the United States changed the 
security dynamic in almost every nation in Asia.  In 
addition, its fall created a distinct culture of anti-
militarism in Japan that persists today.  World War II has 
also left a legacy of fear among Japan’s Asian neighbors of 
what a militarily strong Japan is capable of doing.  As 
Japan enters the 21st Century, it finds itself on a road to 
greater military capability and global responsibility.  
Many nations fear that Japan’s re-emergence as a regional 
power maybe the rebirth of Japanese militarism.  While it 
is unlikely that Japan will ever revert to the imperial 
impulses of the early 20th Century, it is important to 
understand what Japanese militarism means to Japan and to 
its neighbors.   
To understand Japanese militarism, one must first look 
at its cultural and historical origins.  The causes are 
varied and often difficult to determine.  They range from 
the societal issues, such as the samurai’s bushidō code or 
the strict Tokugawa era social hierarchy, to political 
factors, such as the formation and powers of the Meiji era 
cabinet.  External factors like the spread of Western 
Imperialism in Asia and the integration of Western 
technology and economic models in Japan also drove Japanese 
expansion.  This chapter will examine some of the external 
and internal influences on the rise of Japan’s unique type 
of militarism and how excesses of militarism produced the 
strong anti-military backlash of the post-war years.  
6 
                    
A. ORIGINS OF MILITARISTIC CULTURE: SAMURAI AND BUSHIDO 
The Japanese origins of bushidō date back to the 7th 
century, when the Yamato court used conscripts and court 
aristocrats to develop a national military.  Events during 
the 8th century, however, led to the ending of national 
conscription and the decentralization of the Emperor’s 
powerbase. The Emperor Kanmu had sought to expand his 
influence to more of the Japanese main island of Honshu.  
The campaign ultimately proved unsuccessful and in order to 
maintain security, he bestowed the titles of shōgun and 
began to delegate the responsibility of managing the 
outlying areas to the regional clans. By the mid 12th 
century, the rise of a definitive warrior class, the bushi, 
and stronger competing warlords, or daimyō, overpowered the 
central government.1   
The bushi developed into two classes, the rōnin who 
served no individual lord and the samurai who were 
obligated to a lord. During the early Sengoku Jidai, or 
warring states period (1467-1615), rules for becoming a 
samurai were fairly flexible.  But in 1586, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, who had risen to power from very humble origins 
to become the defacto ruler of much of Japan, ruled that 
the samurai could only obtain their title through 
inheritance, and that only the warrior class were 
authorized to carry weapons.  By rigidly enforcing these 
rules, the strict Japanese caste system that remained in 
effect through the early 20th century, was adopted 
throughout Japan.    Besides solidifying his control in 
much of Japan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi also turned his attention 
 1 Library of Congress, JAPAN - A Country Study [Internet Site] 
(Library of Congress, accessed 17 October 2003); available from 
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/jptoc.html. 
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beyond the traditional focus of the main island of Honshū.  
He expanded control to the outlying islands of Kyūshū and 
Shikoku, as well as conducted two unsuccessful military 
campaigns into Korea.2
After Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s death in 1598, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu emerged as the next leader of all of Japan.  He 
resurrected the title of Shōgun because he controlled the 
entire country and founded a system that would last until 
1867.  Over the next 250 years, the bushidō code was 
further developed to reinforce the societal position of the 
relatively nonproductive samurai class.  The bushidō code 
emphasized the virtue of unwavering service and espoused 
the honor of dying as a warrior without disgrace.  The same 
time that this culture was developing, Japan closed itself 
off from the outside world and saw a time of great peace.  
This left the samurai class, which had grown to almost 6 
percent of the population, idle and without direction, and 
often without employment.3  
When Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived in Yokohama in 
1852, the Tokugawa government and the population’s patience 
with the samurai class was already showing signs of strain.  
In 1867, under pressure from a coalition of marginalized 
daimyōs and Imperial court officials, the Shōgun Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu resigned as head of state and declared the 
restoration of imperial rule.  The fourteen-year-old 
Emperor Meiji was instated as the leader of the Japanese 
Empire. The group that had engineered the final fall of the 
 2 Wikipedia, Wikipidia Online Encycclopedia [Internet Site] (2003, 
accessed 20 November 2003); available from 
http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/. 
3 Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 101-111. 
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Tokugawa dynasty published a five-point statement, the 
Charter Oath, which abolished feudalism and proclaimed a 
modern democratic government for Japan.  Although a 
parliament was initially formed, it had no real power, nor 
did Emperor Meiji.  Power had in actuality passed from the 
Tokugawa Shōgun into the hands of the daimyō who had led 
the Restoration. Japan was for all intensive purposes 
controlled by an oligarchy, the genrō, which was comprised 
of the most powerful men of the military, political, and 
economic spheres.   
In 1877, the samurai class was officially disbanded 
and many samurai with no other sources of income fell into 
poverty.  They were often forced to sell the very swords 
that had been their status symbol and had passed from 
father to son for generations, just to buy food.  Some of 
the higher-ranking samurai and daimyō took an active role 
in politics; others turned to their connections with the 
merchant class4; others found employment with the military. 
Others still, such as Saigō Takamori who had originally 
been one of the key supporters of the Meiji Restoration, 
rebelled against the restrictions placed on the samurai 
class.   
The 1877 rebellion in Kyūshū was the last civil war 
fought in Japan. The rebel forces were strictly opposed to 
the modernization attempts of the government.  Many took 
their opposition to modernization so far as to refuse the 
use of firearms, which had actually been introduced to 
Japan in by the Portugeuse in the mid 1500s.5 The Imperial 
forces were able to raise a force of over 65,000 soldiers 
 4 For further information on the relationship between the Samurai and 
Merchant classes see page 7 below. 
9 
                    
equipped with rifles, who easily defeated Saigō and over 
18,000 of his troops, although at a cost of 6,000 dead and 
another 10,000 wounded.6 With the death of Saigō Takamori, 
so died the dreams of a resurrection of the samurai class. 
The Japanese code of bushidō remained and would 
continue to resurface throughout the early 20th century.  
Wishing to modernize their naval and army doctrine and 
training in 1873, the Japanese government brought in the 
British Commander Archibald L. Douglas, who introduced 
British discipline, ceremonies, uniforms and customs to the 
Japanese Naval Academy, which had been founded in 1871.7 The 
British system of training stressed discipline above all 
else, something that was already a cornerstone of Japanese 
bushidō training. As Japan began expanding outwards, 
military leaders called more often on the militaristic 
teachings of the past and began to draw more on the bushidō 
code of honor.  General Anami Korechika Japan’s Minister of 
War, in World War II, , was fond of saying, “obeying a 
command is a virtue.”8
In addition, the Meiji Emperor became the central 
figure in the government and in a sense became the very 
symbol of Japan, in much in the same way as Louis XIV’s 
l’etat, c’est moi, for the Emperor was Japan.  As such, the 
 5 Jansen, 7. 
6 Alan Booth, Looking for the Lost: Journeys through a Vanishing 
Japan (New York: Kodansha International, 1995), 156. Alan Booth's book 
provides a unique perspective of the 1877 Civil War, as the author 
followed on foot the path that Saigo Takamori took. 
7 Ronald H. Spector, At War, At Sea: Sailors and Naval Warfare in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Viking, 2001), 9. 
8 Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day, 1st trade 
paperback ed. (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2002), 104. It is 
interesting to note that this strict discipline was chiefly responsible 
for keeping most troops under control after the surrender, although 
small groups did initially resist the idea of surrender.  
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Japanese soldier was taught to revere the Emperor above all 
else. However, since the Emperor was a distant and 
mysterious figure, many young officers soon came to believe 
that they understood the true goals and desires of the 
Emperor better than the senior officers appointed above 
them.   
This hubris was a main factor in the assassination of 
Marshal Chang Tso-lin in June 1928 by Japanese officers of 
the Kwantung Army in Manchuria with neither the permission 
from, nor knowledge of, the senior officers back in Tōkyō. 
When the Minister of War, General Shirakawa Yoshinori 
learned that Japanese officers were not only involved, but 
also responsible for the death of Marshall Chang, he 
refused to believe it.9 Many in the General Staff believed 
that it was impossible for an officer of the military to 
act independently of the wishes of the Emperor and 
therefore no crime could have been committed.  Of the two 
key officers involved in the assassination, only one was 
ever tried, and that being for dereliction of duty for 
failure to post appropriate guards.10 Similar independent 
action at Mukden, Manchuria in 1937 would instigate the 
Japanese invasion of Mainland China. 
It was the evolution of this sort of independent 
action by junior members of the military and the lack of 
accountability for misdeeds that many Japanese and even 
foreign nations after the war would cite as the main cause 
of militarism in Japan.  While it is likely this is a major 
 9 Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese 
Military, Yale Studies in Political Science, vol. 9 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963), 57-58. 
10 According to Yoshihashi 59, 148, Col Kōmoto Daisaku was convicted 
of these charges, but was still promoted to Director of the South 
Manchurian Railway Company in 1932. 
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factor in the uncontrolled rise of militarism, it would be 
erroneous to assume this was the only factor.  Nonetheless, 
this lack of accountability in the military officer corps 
caused a deep level of distrust of military personnel that 
were repatriated after the war.  In 1954, when the Japan 
Self Defense Forces were established, they were placed 
under a civilian authority, accountable to the Office of 
the Prime Minister, for exactly this reason.  
B. HIERARCHAL ORIGINS OF JAPANESE SOCIETY 
Initially the development of a well ordered and 
disciplined military mirrored many of the social structures 
that existed in Japan.  The concept of social hierarchy 
that developed in the Tokugawa era was rigidly stratified 
and each person’s status was fixed by inheritance.  Every 
family posted their hereditary status and class position on 
their doorway.  This position dictated the clothes and food 
that they could buy and the type of house that they could 
live in.11 Below the Imperial family and court nobles were 
five classes: the samurai, the farmers, the artisans, the 
merchants and finally the outcasts who held jobs shunned by 
normal Japanese and were relegated to living in communities 
that did not appear on land surveys.  
This social structure though was being put to the test 
in the late Tokugawa.  As the number of samurai increased, 
it became harder for lower ranking samurai to maintain a 
standard of living befitting their class.  In addition, as 
the merchant class was able to increase their capability to 
conduct commerce, they increasingly ran into the 
limitations of their social class; they could not move from 
 11 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of 
Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946), 61. 
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their smaller quarters to larger estates.  A natural 
partnership developed between the samurai, who were in need 
of money, and the merchants who were in need of status.  As 
the merchant and samurai families intermingled through 
marriage and adoption, the strict military mindset of the 
samurai was altered.12   
Part of the reform of the Meiji restoration aimed to 
break down the traditional Tokugawa class structure.  The 
samurai class was disbanded and the army abolished the 
practice of assigning rank in accordance with social 
background and the use of the Japanese honorific language 
when talking with superiors.  This being said, the Japanese 
hierarchal mindset did not disappear overnight.13
Japan’s sense of hierarchy moved also to the colonies 
that it established throughout the Pacific.  The closer the 
colonies were to Japan, the higher their rank among the 
“Children of Yamato.”  The highest of these children were 
the Okinawans, the Koreans as middle, and the Formosans as 
the youngest.  This label was applied by Japan to benefit 
the inhabitants of these countries, but the Japanese were 
unable to grasp the resentment that these designations of 
inferiority caused in the various ethnic groups.14 As the 
various nations in Asia rejected Japanese rule, the 
soldiers became more violent in their dealings with the 
populace.  Even when it became obvious to the soldiers that 
the occupied nations had rejected the social order put to 
 12 Ibid, 71-73. many modern day companies trace their origin to the 
merger of the samurai and merchant class. Honda, one of the most 
powerful modern day companies in Japan is one such company. 
13 Ibid, 77-91. 
14 Alan D. Christy, "The Making of Imperial Subjects in Okinawa," in 
Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, ed. T. Barlow (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 153. 
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them by the Japanese, the soldiers clung to their beliefs 
and instructions.  The more the occupied peoples resisted, 
the harsher the response by the Japanese. 
At the same time that the Japanese military was 
bringing “order and discipline” to some of the nations of 
Asia, the Japanese feared becoming the victim of Western 
powers.  As Karel Van Wolferen wrote, “A common Japanese 
term, higaisha ishiki (victimhood consciousness), reflects 
a diffuse but fairly strong sense that the world cannot be 
trusted and that Japan will always be a potential victim of 
capricious external forces.”15   
This distrust had grown in the 1930s, when Japan 
endured racial slights and discrimination by the West 
including “the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century, 
discriminatory immigration policies in the United States 
and elsewhere, and humiliation in the founding moments of 
the League of Nations, when Japan’s request for a simple 
declaration of ‘racial equality’ was rejected.”16  At first 
the Japanese government tried to improve the West’s 
understanding of Japan through a variety of English-
language publications as well as lectures, films, 
exhibitions, and performances of the Japanese arts abroad.17 
These efforts had little effect in improving the 
understanding of Japan in Western countries, nor did it 
greatly improve the Japanese’s understanding of other 
 15 Karel Van Wolferen, "No Brakes, No Compass," The National Interest 
26 (1991): 26. The idea of higaisha ishiki is still part of Japanese 
thinking today.  For a study of how this ties into modern Japanese 
business dealings see Robert M. March, The Japanese Negotiator: 
Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western Logic (New York: Kodansha 
International, 1988). 
16 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific 
War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 204. 
17 Ibid, 97. 
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nations.  The result was a growing belief that only through 
military force could Japan be accepted as an equal among 
the nations of the world. 
C. ASIAN IMPERIALISM: JAPAN JOINS THE CLUB 
The Meiji government’s decision to push for greater 
modernization and a significant role in Asian politics was 
directly related to the worldwide expansion of Western 
nations.  Meiji leaders like turn-of-the-century Premier 
Yamagata Aritomo aimed to “establish the independence of 
our country and to increase the nation’s strength in facing 
the Western powers.”18  
In 1881, a Yokohama newspaper published a report by a 
foreigner who stated, “the Japanese are a happy race, and 
being content with little, are not likely to achieve 
much.”19  It is obvious now that the author could not have 
been more wrong. In the late 1860s and early 1870s Japan 
was already on the way to becoming a regional power.  
Disagreements with the United States regarding Hawaii and 
other strategic islands in the Western Pacific, as well as 
Russian and European expansion into China (especially 
Manchuria), began to become more heated and public.  In 
1871, natives of Formosa killed fifty-four persons from the 
Ryukyu Island chain that were shipwrecked there.  Although 
both Japan and China claimed the Ryukyu Islands, Japan used 
this attack as a pretext to send 3,000 troops to the 
islands three years later.20     
 18 Roger F. Hackett, "The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case 
of Yamagata Aritomo," in Changing Japanese attitudes toward 
modernization, ed. Marius B. Jansen, The Conference on Modern Japan of 
the Association for Asian Studies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1965), 244. 
19 Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations, 1st 
ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 32. 
20 Ibid, 43-44. Japan's claim with China over possession of Formosa 
15 
Japanese expansion into Korea also began in the 1870s.  
Through a display of gunboat diplomacy that Commodore Perry 
would have been proud of, in 1876 the Japanese forced Korea 
to open trade and consular jurisdiction.  The 1876 treaty 
also forced Korea to distance itself from Chinese 
extraterritoriality, an event that would later lead to the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1894.21 In 1895, as unrest spread in 
Korea, Japanese operatives, probably members of - or 
connected to - the Kokuryūkai, or Black Dragons Society, 
conspired with Korean dissidents to assassinate Korea's 
Queen Min, setting Korean-Japan relations back to this very 
day.  After the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war, in 
1905 Japan removed the final obstacle to annexing Korea, 
all it needed was a justification for the world opinion. 
The trigger event came in 1909 when the Governor-General of 
Korea, Ito Hirobumi, was assassinated.  Within a year, 
Korean opposition to Japanese reforms were crushed and 
Korea was officially annexed by Japan. 22
While Japan was working to increase its footprint in 
Asia, it was also pushing for greater status in the 
international community.  The treaties that had been signed 
in the 1850s and 1860s had given foreign nations 
exceptional judicial and economic privileges in Japan.  In 
1871, Iwakura Tomomi led a mission of Japanese government 
and academic personnel on a 22-month mission to the United 
States and 11 European nations.  As a member of the Iwakura 
                     
was settled formally in 1895 with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which 
formally gave control of the island to Japan.   
21 Jansen, 424. For further reading on the politics of Japanese 
involvement in Korea see Jansen 424-436.  
22 The United States profited quite well from the Japanese 
occupation.  From 1897-1939 America had access to the Un-san gold mine, 
which earned a total profit of approximately $15 million.  LaFeber, 51.  
16 
                    
mission said while addressing the city of Sacramento, 
California, “We come to study your strength, that, by 
adopting widely your better ways, we may hereafter be 
stronger ourselves, ...we shall labor to place Japan on an 
equal basis, in the future, with those countries whose 
modern civilization is now our guide.”23 In addition, the 
mission discussed changes to the treaties, but was unable 
to bring about any substantial changes. The United States 
and European powers insisted that treaty revision would not 
take place until Japan reformed its legal system along 
Western lines. It was not until 1894 that any treaty 
provisions for extraterritoriality were formally changed.   
With Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, 
Japan emerged as one of the major powers of Asia and was 
soon competing with Western powers for more colonies.  In 
March 1897, the United States and Japan nearly came to 
blows over the American-run Republic of Hawaii.  The 
government of Hawaii, fearful of a shift in the balance of 
power toward Japan returned more than a thousand immigrants 
back to Japan.  The Japanese responded by demanding an 
indemnity and dispatching a cruiser to Hawaii.  This drew 
the attention of the American naval Strategist Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, who in a letter to President Theodore 
Roosevelt urged the United States immediately to annex the 
islands.24  Roosevelt had preferred to annex Hawaii, but 
 23 Hackett, 245. For very detailed account of the Iwakura Mission see 
Kume Kunitake's Iwakura Embassy 1871-1873: A True Account of the 
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation 
Through the United States of America and Europe. Princeton University 
Press, 1965. 
24 Kenneth Wimmel, Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: 
American Sea Power Comes of Age, 1st ed. (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1998), 
88-89. 
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with a war brewing with Spain, he was content with 
maintaining the status quo.   
When Japan defeated Russia in 1905, America once again 
took notice.  America had only recently assumed control 
over the islands of Samoa, Guam and the Philippines and saw 
the rising power of Japan as a threat to the Asian balance 
of power.  By 1912, when Emperor Meiji died, Japan had not 
only achieved equality with the West but had actually 
surpassed them in East Asia. 
While the rest of the world’s attention turned to 
Europe on the eve of World War I, Japan saw an opportunity 
to expand their empire at the expense of Germany. After the 
war, when China requested Japan return German occupied 
territory in China, Japan responded with the “Twenty-one 
Demands,” issued in 1915.  One of the most controversial of 
these demands was article 4, which involved expanded access 
to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.25  Japanese expansion into 
China and Siberia concerned Western powers.  Starting with 
the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22, efforts were 
made to control Japanese military expansion.  A final 
agreement was reached with Japan in the London Naval 
Conference of 1930.26
In Japan, the final agreements were pushed through the 
Cabinet over the objections of the Naval General Staff.  
This struggle developed into a legal battle over the 
interpretation of the Meiji Constitution.  The Navy General 
Staff argued that they had the right to arm as the Emperor 
had agreed prior to the conference and that the acceptance 
 25 Yoshihashi, 2. 
26 For a full detailed account of the Japanese disagreement over the 
London Naval Conference see Yoshihashi 61-83. 
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by the Cabinet was contrary to the wishes of the Emperor 
and “a violation of the imperial prerogative of supreme 
command.”27  The result was a rift in the Navy between the 
older and more senior Naval Officers who had not been in 
the fleet for quite some time, and those young officers who 
were operating in the fleet who saw the treaty as hindering 
Japanese expansion in Asia.28  In the years leading up to 
World War II, the growing rift in the military became more 
vocal, eventually providing an opportunity for hardliners 
in the military to completely co-opt the Cabinet 
government. 
D. CHECKS AND BALANCES IN THE JAPANESE CABINET 
The lessons learned by the Iwakura mission were 
brought back to Japan and heavily studied and debated.  The 
mission saw as a foremost requirement the need to formalize 
a new central government structure through the drafting of 
a Western style Constitution. The Meiji Constitution, 
adopted in 1889 brought the competing daimyōs of the 
Tokugawa era under a central government. Under this strong 
central nation-state the government had the power to push 
through social, political and economic reforms.   
At the start of the Meiji era, the agrarian and 
growing working class pressured the Japanese leadership to 
develop a publicly elected representative government along 
a Western model.  However, many of the former daimyōs 
feared losing their power base. In response to this, the 
Meiji Constitution established a bicameral system of 
government with an elected lower house and an upper house 
made up of nobles.  The Meiji Constitution drew heavily 
 27 Yoshihashi, 78. 
28 Ibid, 62. 
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from the Prussian Constitution of 1850, which had developed 
to “safeguard state prerogatives from popular control.”29  
As Japan did not have any true noble class besides the few 
daimyō, it was decided that high standing members of 
society, many former daimyōs, would be given titles such as 
Prince, Duke and Lord which allowed entry into the upper 
house.  The lower house, although elected, was not done 
through truly popular means.  The Meiji Election Laws only 
allowed men who paid a national tax of greater than 15 yen 
a year to vote, which accounted for only about 5% of the 
population, mostly those being landlords.30    
The reform of the cabinet had provided the Minister of 
War, the Army and the Navy with direct access to the 
Emperor.  In addition in 1900, Yamagata Aritomo, while 
premier, ruled that only an active military officer could 
serve as War or Navy Minister, a rule that gave the 
military control over the formation of any cabinet.  When 
the Emperor Taisho took the throne in 1912, what balances 
that the Emperor Meiji had been able to maintain 
disappeared.  The military was able to influence the 
cabinet enough to attain the desired decisions on issues 
that benefited them.  As more hard-lined members rose to 
power in the military, the control of the Cabinet greatly 
increased.  In addition, the military with direct access to 
the Emperor via the Army and Navy General Staff could make 
decisions without informing the Cabinet, “at the behest of 
the Emperor.” This is another example of the lack of 
accountability of the military, at the higher levels, which 
 29 Jansen, 390. According to Jansen, the Japanese Constitution was 
also influenced by the German scholar Herman Roesler who was the legal 
advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later the government 
itself from 1878-1893. 
30 Ibid, 415. 
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contributed to deep level of distrust by the civilian 
population, of the military personnel that were repatriated 
after the war.  In this case, it was the “military leaders” 
that were responsible for taking advantage of the Japanese 
population.31
E. ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM 
Although culturally the Japanese and Western nations 
did not see eye to eye, the level of technological and 
economic cooperation was quite astounding. The economic 
systems established in the Meiji era were a result of the 
Japanese government’s view that the fall of China was a 
result of their inability to create a modern nation along 
an industrial model.  By adopting Western technology into 
their own system, Japan's leaders saw that they could 
protect the integrity of the Japanese mainland and ensure 
the prosperity of a 2,600-year-old empire.  The Canadian 
diplomat E. Herbert Norman best summarized the Japanese 
economic policy of the late 19th Century.  
The policy of the Meiji Government was to 
initiate strategic industries, to endow lavishly 
the defense forces, to subsidize generously a 
narrow and comparatively weak merchant banking 
class in order to encourage its entry into the 
field of industry.  The reverse side of this 
policy was the marked disproportionately heavy 
tax burden on the agricultural classes, by the 
stinting of enterprises less vital than those 
connected with defense, and by a general 
impatience at any sign of unrest or democratic 
protest which might precipitate a domestic crisis 
and so hinder or retard the task of 
reconstruction.  Nevertheless, it was this policy 
which succeeded, in the very speedy creation of 
 31 Once again we see hagaisha ishiki; this is a common trend in 
Japanese thought following the War. 
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industries, a merchant marine, an overseas 
market, and an efficient navy.32
After the return of the Iwakura mission, Japan moved 
on at a rapid pace to develop its heavy industries to 
support Japan’s expanding military and industrial needs. 
The Meiji government developed a deliberate strategy to 
modernize strategic industries and subsidize the relatively 
weak banking system in order to encourage investment in 
industries deemed important to the development of a modern 
Japan.  This contrasted with many European developmental 
models such as Germany in which the driving force for 
modernization was a strong “amalgamation of German banks.”33 
Unlike most second and third-tier developmental nations, 
Japan funded its modernization with almost no outside 
investment or foreign loans.  The Japanese concentrated a 
heavy tax burden on the agrarian class and then stifled the 
development of new industries that did not support the 
modernization of an advanced heavy industry to support a 
strong military.34
The Japanese also began a concerted propaganda 
campaign centered around phrases such as fukoku kyohei, 
(rich nation, strong military).35  By the mid 1880s, four 
major industrial arsenals with satellite plants and three 
government shipyards were fully operational and supplying 
 32 E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political 
and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period (New York: International 
Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 208. Quoted by 
Yoshihashi 112-113 
33 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1962), 15.  Gershenkron’s views of tension between 
advanced and backward nations and the need for state intervention fit 
the Japan model well. 
34 Norman, 208. Quoted by Yoshihashi 112-113. 
35 LaFeber, 77. 
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the modern military force.   Arsenals in Tokyo and Osaka 
employed almost 3,000 workers and had Belgian, French, and 
German technicians and engineers repairing arms and 
producing large quantities of explosives and shells.36  
These plants did more than provide ammunition to the 
military; they also helped provided the basis for the 
industrialization of Japan.  Six of the ten private textile 
firms that began operating in the 1880s relied on steam 
engines produced at the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal.  In 
addition the Nagasaki and Hyogo shipyards, originally 
developed to meet the military needs, were eventually sold 
to Iwasaki Yatarō, the founder of Mitsubishi zaibatsu, and 
Kawasaki Shōzō, the founder of Kawasaki, respectively.  
Both Mitsubishi and Kawasaki continued their close 
relationship with the military.  In the fall of 1893, on 
the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, Kawasaki built eight 
warships within a two-month period.37  
The Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905 also provided the 
impetus for a major spike in the expansion of Japanese 
industry. While the small family owned manufacturing 
businesses of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period 
provided the initial spark, by the end of the Meiji era in 
1912, the Japanese factories had developed a core group of 
over 150,000 skilled industrial workers.  The table below 
highlights the impact that military operations had on 
expanding the industry of Japan.  
 36 Kozo Yamamura, "Success Illgotten?  The Role of Meiji Militarism 
in Japan's Technological Progress," The Journal of Economic History 
XXXVII, no. 1 (1977): 114.  In 1884, the Tokyo arsenal employed 2,094 
workers, the Osaka arsenal employed 925. 
37 Ibid: 117-120. 
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Table 1.   Number of Workers in Military Arsenals vis-á-vis 
Private Firms in Shipbuilding, Machinery and Machine-
Tool Industries38 
 
Year Workers in Military Workers in Private 
1899 25,074 20,872 
1903 53,593 32,029 
1907 93,704 55,829 
1910 68,605 46,834 
1912 76,526 69,810 
The constant push to supply the military with greater 
capability and numbers to support Japanese expansionism was 
seen as a driving force in the modernizing Japanese 
industry.  However, this had a very detrimental side 
effect.  From 1890 to 1919, the annual budget expenditures 
for military spending remained between 30%-50% of Japan’s 
annual budgets (this was between 10% and 20% of the total 
national income).39  In March of 1927, and as a prophecy of 
things to come throughout the world, thirty-five banks, to 
include the Bank of Taiwan, one of the largest in Japan, 
were forced to close.  The scandal forced a change of 
government.  At the same time in Nanking, fighting between 
the Nationalists and Communists threatened Japanese people 
living in China.  The new Cabinet led by Tanaka Giichi 
sought to focus on China to distract public opinion from 
the deepening financial crisis at home.40   
By the early and middle 1930s, social unrest was 
becoming more violent, while some of this had more to do 
with the desire of a small group of officers and 
politicians to seize more power for them and the military, 
                     38 Ibid: 124. 
39 LaFeber, 77. 
40 Yoshihashi, 12-13. 
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other groups were truly concerned with the heavy taxes that 
had been placed on the agrarian sector.  The burden that 
had allowed Japan to fund the building of its economy and 
military could not be maintained when the rice, silk and 
oat market crashed in 1932.  From 1932 to 1935 the price of 
these commodities dropped almost 50%.41  Many military 
officers had joined the military from an agricultural 
background, mostly because it was the only way for them to 
escape heavy burdens being put on this sector.  It was 
these young officers who believed the only way for Japan to 
succeed in the future was through greater expansion 
overseas. 
The war years witnessed the culmination of Japan’s 
problems.  Expansion, which was supposed to increase 
Japan’s security, actually worked to undermine it.  
Furthermore, it brought civil-military relations to a 
nadir, as the Japanese, correctly, saw the death and 
hardships of war as the direct result of the “expand or 
die” mentality instilled by the Meiji Restoration and 
progressively militarized government in the 1930s, and the 
lack of civilian control of the military.  The consequence 
was the nuclear holocaust of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.  
Therefore, the Japanese emerged from the war firmly 
committed to working for peaceful regional relations, 
intent on establishing civilian control of the military, 
along with an aversion to nuclear weapons. 
The surrender of Japan in 1945 followed by the U.S. 
occupation allowed the implementation of many useful post-
war reforms that removed some of the more repressive 
aspects of imperial Japanese society and economy.  Land 
 41 Ibid, 110. 
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redistribution allowed many peasants to become independent 
farmers.  However, the few factories that survived the 1945 
bombings by Allied planes were quickly out of business.  
The massive labor force that had supported the Japanese 
war-machine found themselves without jobs.  While most 
laborers had supported the expansion of the military and 
military based industries to their own benefit, when that 
base disappeared so did the support. Discontent grew 
quickly and most people blamed the military for taking 
advantage of the country’s work force.42     
The economic policies set forth in the pre-War era, 
however, did not completely disappear after the war.  
Although much of the tax burden was removed from the 
agricultural sector, the post-war economic policies 
promoted domestic production and created a protected 
industry, similar to in the Meiji era.  The Japanese 
zaibatsu were broken up, but in its place keiretsu 
organizations developed.  While zaibatsu were single 
monopolistic companies, the keiretsu created large 
integrated groups and layers of small firms that generated 
an intense investment driven competition for the market 
share.43  The Japanese workers quickly shifted their 
devotion away from building a strong nation through a 
strong military, to building a strong nation through a 
strong economy.  Without the massive military expenditures 
of the pre-war period, the average Japanese found this to 
be a much easier process. 
 42 Once again hagaisha ishiki. 
43 Laura D'Andrea Tyson and John Zysman, "Developmental Strategy and 
Production Innovation in Japan," in Politics and Productivity: The Real 
Story of Why Japan Works, ed. Chalmers A. Johnson, Laura D'Andrea 
Tyson, and John Zysman (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1989), 62. 
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To the Japanese military man, surrender was never an 
option.  The shame of surrender was burned so deeply into 
the consciousness of the Japanese that during World War II, 
Japanese Prisoners of War spoke with shocked disparagement 
of American POWs who actually asked to have their names 
reported to their government so that their families would 
know they were alive.  Some Japanese POWs asked to be 
killed but stated, “If your customs do not permit this, I 
will be a model prisoner.”44  A small group of officers even 
attempted to forestall the surrender by holding the Emperor 
hostage in the Imperial Palace.  While they did manage to 
secure the outer grounds, the soldiers reportedly never 
truly considered harming the Emperor, only removing those 
traitors that had convinced him that the war was lost.45 
Those few days in August 1945 before the Occupation Forces 
landed in Japan were filled with confusion and 
hopelessness.  People were uncertain what was in store for 
them with an unconditional surrender.  As the military lost 
control of the security situation in Japan, so did the 
people turn their backs on the military.  With the arrival 
of American troops, the Japanese people looked to not only 
“reconstructing buildings but also rethinking what it meant 
to speak of a good life and a good society.”46
F. CAUSES OF ANTI-MILITARISTIC BACKLASH 
As put forth in the previous pages, a number of 
factors led to the Japanese anti-military feeling following 
the War.  To the average citizen, the defeat by the Allies 
 44 Benedict, 41. 
45 Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day, 1st trade 
paperback ed., Toyko: Kodansha International, 2002.  
46 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War 
II, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), 25. 
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was a result of the ultimate betrayal by the military.  The 
Emperor had been led astray by remnants of the corrupt 
military and forced to broadcast the surrender in his own 
voice for all to hear.  The Emperor was forced to 
officially disavow his position as descendant of the Shinto 
sun goddess, Amaterasu Ōmikami and there was even fear that 
he would have to step down as the ruler of Japan.  To the 
Japanese this was truly the unbearable.  As Ruth Benedict 
stated, “the Japanese Prisoner of War was quite explicit 
that the reverence given the Imperial Household was 
separable from militarism and aggressive war policies.  The 
Emperor was to them, however, inseparable from Japan.”47   
As the weeks after the war progressed, growing 
resentment of the military continued.  The Japanese turned 
their concept of higaisha ishiki against the military. The 
populace felt, and rightfully so, as if they had been taken 
advantage of by the military. They had stood by while 
Allied planes had destroyed entire cities first by fire-
bombing and later with the Atomic bombs in Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima, and had listened to their military leaders say 
how it might be necessary for the entire Japanese nation 
all to die “like shattered jewels.”48 The Japanese had lost 
over 3 million people during the war, and soon the lack of 
food, adequate shelter and jobs were blamed on the 
military.   
G. SUMMARY 
The rise and fall of Japanese Militarism is arguably 
the most significant event in Asia of the 20th Century. 
After the fall of the Tokugawa dynasty, in the Meiji era, 
 47 Benedict, 32. 
48 Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 22. 
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the development of a weak representative government, 
reliant on the military to form a Cabinet, prohibited any 
formation of a system of checks and balances. The Western 
European experience provided a roadmap that was essentially 
used in Japan’s “path to modernity.”  Although the Japanese 
Meiji era developmental model is considered atypical by 
Western standards, Japan consciously emulated the West in 
their development of a modern nation-state, an industrial 
and liberal capitalist economy, and a parliamentary 
democracy.  They did this by integrating the Western 
developmental model into their own existing culture and 
society, but leaving in place the strong militaristic 
culture of the Tokugawa period.  
The Meiji Emperor had, with his genrō, tried to 
develop a strong central government that would keep the 
military in check.  During the Taishō era, a sick and weak 
Emperor was unable to participate in the governing of 
Japan, leading to greater activity by political parties and 
radical elements.  This looked as if it would change during 
the early Shōwa years, but the death of Premier Tanaka 
Giichi in November 1929 deeply affected Emperor Hirohito 
causing him to be much more reserved in his dealings with 
the Cabinet and the Military.49 This allowed more control in 
the decision making process by the Military General Staff.  
Attempts by the military to control the future of Japan 
would continue up to the very surrender of Japan in 1945.   
After the war, the Japanese turned quickly on the 
military forces that had been such a major part of their 
lives and culture for centuries.  The Japanese population 
 49 Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 1st ed. 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 218. 
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was able to make the radical break from the past in order 
to develop a true democratic and peaceful society. The side 
effect of this has been the development of a culture of 
anti-militarism in Japan and distrust of a future emergence 
of an Imperial Japan by Japan’s regional neighbors.  As the 
Japanese military moves into greater global 
responsibilities, internal and external cultural obstacles 
will emerge.  How, or even if, Japan chooses to face these 
challenges will likely affect the regional security 
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III. THE LEGACIES OF WORLD WAR II 
To understand why Japan is clearly ready for a 
strategy of regional and world engagement, it is helpful to 
understand why they became military “isolationists” after 
World War II.  Even more so, it is important to realize 
that the legacies of World War II – the “Peace 
Constitution”, civilian control of the military, and the 
aversion to nuclear weapons were never absolutes, but were 
adopted to appease the United States, the regional 
neighbors, and Japanese public opinion.  Still, the 
Japanese modified them as the requirements of defense and 
Allied, priorities changed. 
When the peace constitution was imposed on Japan by 
American occupiers over 50 years ago, the idea was to 
assure Japan's own people and their neighbors in Asia that 
Imperial Japanese forces would never again terrorize the 
region.  Japan’s post–World War II National Defense Policy 
is derived from Article 9 of its Constitution, which states 
that, “land, sea and air forces will never be maintained, 
as well as other war potential”.50   
Article 9 was the one of the three main themes that 
General MacArthur insisted on for the development of the 
“Peace Constitution”.  It was put in as a measure of 
assurance to the Allies and the regional neighbors that 
Japan would not be able to build up its military might 
again.  The Japanese people, who had become anti-military, 
even before the end of World War II, favored this portion 
 50 Takada Toshihiro, The Constitution of Japan, 
<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-
Constitution.html>  [16 March 2004]. 
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of the constitution.  However, the text of Article 9 was 
written in such a way that depending on its interpretation 
there was no guarantee that Japan would not rebuild its 
military.  This was noticed by the Chinese representative 
to the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in September 1946, when 
reviewing the final draft of the “Peace Constitution”.  The 
FEC wanted a change made, not to Article 9, but to what 
became Article 66, which basically states that cabinet 
members must be civilians.  This provided a pseudo loop 
hole for future interpretations, because by not allowing 
military personnel to hold a cabinet position, it was 
assumed that there was a functioning military to begin 
with.51      
No sooner had the “peace constitution” been adopted 
than Japanese leaders began to hedge on its central 
provision.  Beginning in 1950, the United States actively 
encouraged Japan to rearm, in part to take up the slack for 
American deployments to fight in the Korean War. In 
deference to the “peace constitution”, Japan's new “armed 
force” was called a National Police force and then renamed 
a Self-Defense Force (SDF) or ‘Jieitai’ in 1954. Over time, 
the SDF has become a very significant military 
organization.  Because Article 9 does not deny Japan the 
right of self-defense, the Japanese government’s 
interpretation allows for the minimum force necessary for 
protection.52  It is on this basis that Japan’s overall 
defense policy was approved in May 1957 by the Cabinet.53   
 51 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War 
II, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), 397. 
52 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2001 (Urban Connections, 
2001), 77. 
53 Ibid, 78. 
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The basic goal of Japan’s current defense policy is 
the continued promotion of efforts for peace.  This 
requires a credible defense force, to shore up the security 
arrangements between the United States and Japan.54   
The SDF has grown from a force of 75,000 personnel 
when it was the National Police Reserve to just under a 
quarter of a million personnel today.  The SDF organization 
has been changing very slowly, however, its fundamental 
structure has remained mostly unchanged in the post-war 
period.  The reason for this stability derives from Japan’s 
cultural and historical context as well as Japan’s post-
World War II ideology.   
The current structure of the SDF is comprised of 
various units centering on the Ground Self-Defense Force 
(GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-
Defense Force (ASDF).  All are armed organizations which 
play the central role in Japan’s national defense, a goal 
of the organization.  Each force consists of combat units 
and support units such as supply, maintenance, transport, 
and medical services to provide the necessary backup to 
maintain a constant level of equipment and troop 
performance.  This organization is very similar to the 
United States military, because from the beginning of its 
development, during the occupation era, Japan received 
advice from the United States. 
The Japanese government tries to avoid drastic changes 
in the structure of the SDF, so that people, both 
domestically and internationally, do not feel threatened by  
 54 Ibid. 
34 
                    
the existence of the SDF.  To increase the transparency of 
the defense policy, Japan has broken it down into four 
guiding principles. 
The first principle is that of being “Exclusively 
Defense-Oriented”.  This means that Japan is not allowed to 
make use of its forces unless there is an armed attack 
against Japan by another country.  If such a case were to 
occur, Japan can use only that force necessary to repel the 
attack.55  It also means that Japan is not allowed any 
offensive platforms such as long range missiles, bombers, 
or aircraft carriers.56
The second principle is anchored in the premise that 
Japan must not become a military power.  The definition of 
“military power” is vague at best and is open to 
interpretation.  The Japanese define it, at least in the 
context of this principle, as not posing a threat to the 
security of other countries.  To achieve this, Japan has 
maintained their defense spending at one percent of their 
GNP and adhered to their “Non-Export Principle” of not 
exporting weapons to foreign countries other than the 
United States.57  This principle shows how Japan’s current 
defense policies are still being shaped by the past.  Just 
as Article 9 was adopted to appease Japan’s regional 
neighbors after World War II, today Japan is still 
adjusting and defining its policies based on the regional 
fears of past Japanese power. 
 55 Japan Defense Agency Website, <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm> 
[18 March 2004]. 
56 Mitsuru Kurosawa, Visiting Professor at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, from Osaka University, Lecturing on Japan’s 
Security Policy at The Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA., 19 
November, 2003.  
57 Ibid. 
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The nuclear legacy in Japan arose from the devastation 
created by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  But it 
was the 1954 incident involving the fishing boat “Lucky 
Dragon #5” that truly propelled anti-nuclear sentiment 
throughout Japan.58  On March 1, 1954, the United States 
conducted a nuclear test at Bikini Atoll.  The fallout 
affected the crew and cargo of the Lucky Dragon #5.  Upon 
return to Japan the nine tons of fish on board the boat 
were sold in four major cities and eaten by at least 100 
people before the contamination was discovered.  This 
caused a national panic known as the “tuna panic”.  This 
devastated the fishing industry throughout Japan as people 
stopped eating marine products.  The incident also saw a 
resurgence of victims from Nagasaki and Hiroshima brought 
back to public awareness, which furthered fueled the anti-
nuclear/peace movement throughout Japan.59    
The “Peace Constitution” does not prohibit Japan from 
having nuclear weapons.  However, as they are the only 
country so far to have been on the receiving end of a 
nuclear attack, they naturally have developed a strong 
aversion to them.  It is because of this aversion, as well 
as their interpretation of the constitution, that they have 
developed and adhere to their “Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles”, which is the third of the four guiding 
principles.  These non-nuclear principles forbid Japan to 
possess, manufacture, or to allow the introduction of 
nuclear weapons into Japan.  This policy is also in line 
with the Basic Atomic Energy Law of 1956, and the Nuclear 
 58 Ibid. 
59 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “A-bomb Investigations after 
the Occupation”, 
<http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/exhibit_e/exh
0307_e/exh03078_e.html> [13 August 2004]. 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1976, both of which prohibit 
Japan from possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons.60
The fourth principle, as is true of most democratic 
states, pertains to “Civilian Control of the Military”.  
Reflecting on Japan’s past, it was the power of the defense 
establishment and its ability to utilize this power that 
led Japan into a series of aggressive wars ending with 
World War II.  Because of this, Japan has placed its 
defense community under strict civilian control, to provide 
the necessary checks and balances to prevent a recurrence 
of militarism.     
A. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE AGENCY 
The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other 
state ministers who comprise the Cabinet to be civilians, 
thus eliminating the pre-1945 problem of military ministers 
of the army and navy able to bring down governments by 
their resignation.  The Prime Minister, is the commander-
in-chief of the SDF, and is directly responsible to the 
Cabinet and the Diet for the defense of Japan.61  He is also 
the most important official in the defense organization.  
However, because of the diffusion of authority within the 
defense organization, the Prime Minister’s actual power is 
limited.  A civilian is appointed as Minister of State for 
Defense, even though it is an agency vice a ministry, who 
exercises general control over the SDF’s activities.  Also, 
civilian counselors are assigned to assist the Minister of 
State for Defense in formulating basic policies relating to 
the SDF. 
 60 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2001 (Urban Connections, 
2001), 79. 
61 Ibid, 79. 
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The Security Council of Japan is established within 
the Cabinet as an organ to deliberate important defense 
matters such as budgetary issues.  They also approve 
recommended defense policies.  But the Security Council has 
very minimal involvement in the everyday business of the 
Defense Agency.  It does not maintain its own staff and, 
therefore, it does not have much impact on the beginning 
stages of policy formation.  The members of the Security 
Council tend to reflect or slant their views towards the 
parent ministries which they represent.  Like other 
governmental decision-making processes, the Security 
Council’s role is to develop a behind-the-scenes consensus 
first so that, when the Council meets, an agreed upon 
course of action is easily attainable.62  Compromises within 
the organization are common.  Even naming the Security 
Council with that title was a compromise.  In 1986, the 
name “Security Council” vice the “National Security 
Council” was created out of respect for the opposition 
parties within the Diet and to tone down the implication of 
military security.63  As previously mentioned, the Prime 
Minister is directly responsible to the Cabinet and the 
Diet.  Before he can take any action in areas dealing with 
decisions on the Defense Outline, defense planning, 
mobilization of the SDF, and other matters related to or 
concerning national defense, he must consult with the 
Security Council first.64  Below is an outline of the 
organization of the Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces. 
 62 Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan’s Defense: Technology, 
Economics & Strategy, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc, 1992), 22-23. 
63 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan’s National Security: 
Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World, (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 41. 
64 Ibid, 187. 
 Figure 1.   Outline of Organization of Defense Agency and SDF.65 
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 65 Japanese Defense Agency Website, 
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm, [18 March 2004]. 
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IV. THE “MILITARIZATION” OF JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the legacies of 
World War II – The Peace Constitution, civilian control of 
the military, and the aversion to nuclear weapons – was 
never absolute.  The end of the Cold War and the rise of 
China has accelerated what might be called the 
“militarization” of Japanese defense policy. 
In the past decade China has prospered economically, 
giving them the ability to begin modernizing and increasing 
its military capabilities.  In doing so they have built up 
their missile arsenal along the Taiwan Straits and are 
actively involved in the proliferation of missile 
technologies.  Since the end of the Cold War China has 
become more of an assertive power.  This is one reason 
Japan must re-evaluate its defense policy. 
The other reason was the end of the Cold War, where 
Japan was dependent on the United States for its security. 
Japan was forced to look at the new international order and 
try to establish where it fits in.  There are new factors 
that are affecting the peace and stability of the Asian 
region such as terrorist groups and rogue states.  Japan 
has come to the realization that they can no longer use 
just economics and diplomacy in its foreign policy, but one 
that has to contribute militarily to the security of the 
region. 
The genesis of Japan’s increased willingness to use 
the military as a tool of foreign policy was a direct 
result of the 1991 Gulf War, to which Japan contributed $13 
million but no troops.  In return, Japan received much 
40 
international criticism.  In fairness, there was little 
popular support in Japan for sending troops to the Gulf in 
1991.  Even had popular support existed legally (by their 
Constitution) Japan did not have any authority to 
participate in the campaign.66  This criticism spawned 
debate within Japan regarding their defense policy and the 
future roles of its military forces.  In June of 1992, 
after months of bitter debate, the Japanese Parliament 
approved the “International Peace Cooperation Law”.  This 
law allows for the use of military troops overseas for the 
first time since World War II, enabling Japan to join 
international peacekeeping forces.  It also provides a five 
principle basis as to how the peacekeeping operations will 
be carried out.  The table below lists the five principals. 
 
Table 2.   The Five Principles.67 
The Five Principles  
1) Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the 
parties to armed conflicts. 
2) Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well 
as Japan's participation in such operations has been obtained from 
the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts. 
3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality not favoring 
any of the parties to armed conflicts. 
4) Should any of the requirements in the above mentioned guideline 
cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw SDF 
Units. 
5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to 
protect the personnel's lives, etc. 
      
                     66 Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2003-04: 
Fragility and Crisis, (The National Bureau of Asian Research Seattle, 
Washington, 2003), 106. 
67 Japan’s Contribution to International Peace Official Website, 
<http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/pref_e.html#5rules>, [20 March 2004]. 
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At the time, supporters of the bill said it would 
enable Japan to go beyond "checkbook diplomacy" and pull 
its weight in contributing to international security.  This 
legislation also allows for up to 2,000 SDF troops to be 
dispatched for U.N. peacekeeping operations.68
Japan's involvement in U.N. Peacekeeping operations is 
not merely the result of external pressures, but also the 
product of a genuine desire to become more involved in 
world affairs and to promote safety on a global level.69 The 
end of Japanese non-interventionism has certainly not come 
with any haphazard participation in world affairs. Numerous 
instances since 1992 have exemplified the fact that Japan 
is quite serious about its new contributory role. In fact, 
since the government pushed through the Peacekeeping 
Operations Act, Japan has already sent troops to fix roads 
and bridges in Cambodia, set up a logistics team in 
Mozambique, and helped Rwandan refugees stranded in Zaire. 
At the end of 1995, the Golan Heights became Japan's 
showcase overseas military operation and the first time it 
has committed itself to undertaking a mission in the 
volatile Middle East.  Below is a list of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping - International Humanitarian Relief 
Operations involving the SDF. 
 68 Richard Holbrooke, “Japan and the United States: Ending the 
Unequal Partnership”, Foreign Affairs (Winter 1991/1992): 51. 
69 Anonymous, “Japan Edges Forward”, The Economist, 27 April 1996, 
35. 
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Table 3.   PKO and Relief Operations.70 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 












-16 TROOPS AS CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS 
-TWO 600 MEMBER ENGINEER UNITS  
MSDF 
-TWO TRANSPORT SHIPS AND ONE SUPPLY 
SHIP 
ASDF 










-TWICE SENT FIVE STAFF OFFICERS 












-TWO STAFF OFFICERS 














-TEN STAFF OFFICERS 
-ONE 522 MEMBER ENGINEER UNIT 
MSDF 




International Humanitarian Relief Operations 









-MEDICAL, SANITATION, WATER SUPPLY 
PERSONNEL 
ASDF 







-113 MEMBER TRANSPORT UNIT 
-NUMBEROUS FLIGHTS OF C-130Hs 




                     70 Compiled from Japan’s Contributions to International Peace 
Website, <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/results_e.html>, [21 March 2004]. 
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A. JAPAN – U.S. MILITARY COOPERATION 
In many ways, Japan's commitment to U.N. Peacekeeping 
efforts can be seen in the context of its changing 
relationship with the United States. In the past, America 
has provided for the external security of Japan, allowing 
Japan to focus its efforts on other areas of national 
interest.  Many have asserted that it is now time for Japan 
to play a bigger role in its own security, one commensurate 
with its economic power.  And indeed, Japan is responding 
one step at a time.  Since the Persian Gulf War, Japan has 
begun breaking long-standing security taboos, which started 
with the passing of its landmark 1992 International Peace 
Cooperation Law. 
In April 1996, Japan and the United States reaffirmed 
the strength of its bilateral relationship with the “U.S.-
Japan Joint Declaration on Security”.  This declaration was 
the basis for a study on the “New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 
Military Cooperation” in 1997, which calls for greater 
defense cooperation between the two countries.71  These 
guidelines also provided the foundation of the “Law 
Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of 
Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” in 1999.  
This law makes it possible for the Japanese Self-Defense 
Force (JSDF) to provide logistical support to U.S. forces 
in military contingencies near Japan.  It does not permit 
the JSDF to participate in a combatant role.72
 71 Mitsuru Kurosawa, Visiting Professor at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, from Osaka University, Lecturing on Japan’s 




                    
One of the more controversial issues in the Asian 
region is that of a national missile defense system in 
Japan.  In August 1998, the firing of a North Korean 
Taepodong missile spurred Japan to further its research on 
missile defense.  Keeping in line with the 1997 guidelines 
of United States-Japan military cooperation, 1998 brought 
about the declaration of “Joint Research on Missile 
Defense” between the U.S. and Japan.   Though both 
countries had conducted their own individual studies on 
missile defense, the issues with North Korea have provided 
the impetus for the United States and Japan to combine 
their efforts and to increase the strength of their 
alliance.  
The country that is primarily concerned with Japan 
developing a national missile defense system is China.  On 
September 3, 2003, in the first summit between Japanese and 
Chinese defense leaders in five years, Defense Agency 
Chief, Shigeru Ishiba infuriated Chinese Defense Minister 
Cao Gangchuan by disclosing Japan had included funds in the 
FY 04 budget for the actual deployment of the TMD.  The 
Chinese Defense Minister exploded with fury, stating: “This 
will lead to the collapse of the global military balance” 
and “This may cause a new arms race.”73  Although Japan 
stated that the purpose of TMD is to ward-off the DPRK 
missile threat, Beijing believes that it is primarily aimed 
at deterring China.  China points to a Japanese Defense 
Agency, defense white paper released in August 2003 that 
 
73 Tokyo Sentaku, “China ‘Furious’ Over Inclusion of MD 
Deployment Funds in Japan’s FY04 Budget,” Tokyo Sentaku, Oct 1, 2003, 
https://portal.rccb.osis.gov/servlet/Search?action=repGetContent&conten
tid=xml_products:JPP20031007000024&rskey=currentResults&paramkey=curren
tSearch&idx=0 [28 July 2004].   
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sounds an alarm over the defense build-up in China and 
states that of the 150 ballistic missiles in China, half 
are nuclear and all are aimed at Japan.  This leads China 
to assume that Japan perceives its mid-to long-term threat 
to be China, not the DPRK.  China is also angered over the 
TMD decision because it threatens to diminish the power of 
China’s missiles and with it China’s clout in Asia, and it 
could be used as an offensive weapon against China.74
B. POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
In reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and in support of the 
United States’ stance on terrorism, Japan again adopted new 
laws which expanded the interpretation of “Article 9”. 
The three new laws, 1) The Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law of 2001, 2) The Law on Armed Contingency in 
Japan of 2003, 3) The Law Concerning the Special measures 
on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, were 
enacted in a span of three years.   
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of 2001 
permits Japan to dispatch forces for supply and 
transportation as well as for repair, maintenance, and 
medical activities to/for other countries located within 
the territory of Japan, the Indian Ocean (including the 
Persian Gulf), Diego Garcia, the territory of Australia, 
the territories of countries located on the coast of the 
Indian Ocean and the territories of countries along the 
routes taken between these specified territories.75  With 
this law in effect, Japan dispatched its Maritime Self-
 74 Ibid. 
75 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/terro0109/policy/plan_o.html>, [22 March 2004]. 
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Defense Forces consisting of refueling ships to refuel 
coalition warships and Aegis destroyers that participated 
in “Operation Enduring Freedom” in an anti-terrorism role.76
The 2003 Laws on Armed Contingency in Japan are a set 
of emergency bills that direct Japan’s response if ever 
there is an attack on Japan.  These bills are significant 
for three reasons.  First they enhance the reliability of 
the security arrangement between the United States and 
Japan. Second, they aim to increase the trust of Japan by 
other countries, while at the same time strengthening the 
international order.  Third, they seek to deter a potential 
attack on Japan by making clear the nature of Japan’s 
response.  Although Japan remains a nation averse to 
military action except as a last resort, recent world 
events have caused Japan to review its security options.77     
Finally, the Law Concerning the Special measures on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was 
passed to assist in the reconstruction effort in Iraq. 
Japan has a vested interest in the region as Iraq is a one 
of Japan’s largest suppliers of oil.78  This law explains 
that Japan’s SDF and support personnel will provide medical 
and water supply services, rehabilitation and maintenance 
of schools and other public facilities, all while 
 76 I was aboard the USS HIGGINS (DDG 76) while deployed to the Middle 
East from November 2002 to February 2003 and witnessed the re-supply of 
coalition warships from a JMSDF refueling ship prior to entering the 
Arabian Gulf as well as a JMSDF Aegis destroyer participating in 
patrols of the Gulf of Oman.  
77 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/legistlation.html>, [22 March 
2004]. 
78 Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2003-04: 
Fragility and Crisis, (The National Bureau of Asian Research Seattle, 
Washington, 2003), 91. 
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maintaining a close relationship with the relevant 
embassies or countries for coordination purposes.79
In carrying out these new roles, Japan is careful to 
ensure that the activities of the SDF remain non-offensive.  
As China is overly sensitive to almost any change in the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, adopting non-threatening roles will 
help Japan avoid misunderstandings within the region.80
C. REGIONAL CHALLENGES 
Japan’s military capabilities have increased since 
1996 as a result of redefining the U.S.-Japan alliance that 
broadens Japan’s strategic role in the region.  Japan began 
engaging in anti-piracy and mine-sweeping activities, and 
JMSDF warships participated in more high profile missions 
in the Indian Ocean during the war against terrorism in 
Afghanistan.81  These new roles that Japan’s JSDF are 
engaging in are creating some challenges for Japan in 
dealing with its regional neighbors. 
1. China 
Japan and China have had thirty-two years of 
normalized relations, the majority of which have been 
economic in nature. Security issues between the two 
countries did not really begin to evolve until the 
beginning of the Korean War.  At the urging of the United 
States, Japan established a defense force which in turn 
caused China to begin spending more on defense.  The two 
countries, however, never directly came into military 
 79 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/law_o.html>, [22 
March 2004]. 
80 Michael E. Brown, et al. eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge:  The 
MIT Press, 2000) p. 137. 
81 See note 76. 
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contact.  Both countries strived not to become directly 
involved with each other militarily.  This was a difficult 
feat as their respective allies were immersed in the Cold 
War.  A major step in maintaining this “separation of 
forces” was the Bandung conference of 1955.  This 
conference at which both Japanese and Chinese delegates 
were present, agreed that the foreign policy of both 
countries would be one of peaceful co-existence.82   
Until 1971, neither the Japanese nor the Chinese had a 
clearly defined bilateral security relationship towards 
each other.  They were able to maintain their security 
relations without labeling one a security threat to the 
other.83  It was the Chinese–United States Communiqué of 
1972 that brought the security issue to the forefront for 
both Japan and China.  The Chinese–United States 
relationship provoked both Japan and China to reevaluate 
their security policies towards one another and the rest of 
the Asian Pacific region.  Instead of looking at each other 
as potential adversaries, Japan and China viewed their 
relationship as a way to provide a stabilizing element in 
the security of the Asian Pacific region.  They would 
“become part of what Henry Kissinger called, the new 
structure of peace”.84    
With recent developments in the world such as the 
North Korean nuclear issue and the “War on Terror” Japan 
has been expanding its defense policies and roles, a trend 
that has caught China’s attention.  Japan needs to be 
careful about its approach to new engagement policies in 
 82 Christopher Howe, China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 48. 
83 Ibid, 50. 
84 Ibid. 
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the 21st Century with regards to China.  China perceives 
these activities as a combined effort by the United States 
and Japan to continue their Cold War method of bilateral 
relationships for three reasons: first it aims to maintain 
U.S. hegemony within the region; second it seeks to 
increase Japan’s regional power; finally, it looks to 
contain China.85
China’s concern about the increasing military role of 
Japan within the U.S.-Japan alliance was laid out by 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang in 2002: 
“…We hope the bilateral defense arrangement between Japan 
and the United States will not go beyond its bilateral 
nature and will not touch any third party.”86  Analysts at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Institute of 
Japanese Studies believe that “China is the new objective 
of the alliance.”87  The Chinese are also afraid that, 
within the new guidelines of the alliance, the United 
States does not plan on keeping Japan in check militarily, 
thus allowing Japan to engage in “collective self-defense”, 
e.g. join an alliance aimed at containing Beijing.  Under 
the umbrella of the alliance, this would allow, should the 
need arise, Japan to aid the United States militarily if a 
conflict ever developed between China and the United 
States.88
Although China has been concerned with the 
redefinition of the alliance between Japan and the United 
 85 Robert Sutter, “China and Japan:  Trouble Ahead?” The Washington 
Quarterly 25.4, 2002, pp. 37-44. 
86 Banning Garrett, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” Asian Survey: vol37, no.4, 1997, p. 387. 
87 Ibid, p.388. 
88 Ibid, p. 390. 
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States and Tokyo’s new “engagement” policies, China would 
be just as concerned if there were a deterioration of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance because Japan could potentially become 
the most powerful, independent, and remilitarized country 
within the East Asian region.  This could destabilize the 
entire region.89
2. Taiwan 
The formal ties between Japan and Taiwan go back to 
1895 and the Treaty of Shimonoseki in which China ceded 
Taiwan to Japan at the end of the Sino-Japanese War.  Japan 
continued to rule over Taiwan until the end of World War 
II.  Taiwan presents an interesting dilemma for Japan both 
economically and politically.  Economically Japan is the 
fourth largest trading country involved in Taiwan and 
politically there is a non-governmental working 
relationship between the two countries that is in 
accordance with the Japan-China Joint Communiqué of 1972. 
Japan and Taiwan are not that different with regards 
to the achievements of Japan and the goals of Taiwan.  In a 
presidential press conference delivered on February 3, 
2004, President Chen Shui Bian stated that security and 
independence are the two major goals for Taiwan.  He also 
identified democracy and economics as the two avenues that 
are key to achieving international recognition and 
independence.90  These two goals and strategies, should 
Taiwan achieve them, are very similar to those that have 
made Japan a successful nation. 
 89 Ibid, p. 396. 
90 President Chen’s Press Conference, Presidential Statement, Press 




                    
Taiwan should support Japan’s new defense policies and 
its strategy of taking on a larger military role with in 
the region.  This allows Taiwan to work towards improving 
its relations with Japan and, hopefully, enhancing its 
status in the Asia-Pacific region.  Through its relations 
with Japan, the door could be opened for Taiwan to push for 
its independence from China.   
If Japan and Taiwan where to come to terms and form a 
mutual security treaty, China would undoubtedly break off 
its relations with Japan because it would then perceive 
Japan as a threat.  This would also increase the tensions 
that already exist between China and Taiwan.  As is, 
Japan’s alliance with the United States obligates Tokyo to 
aid the United States militarily should the United States 
ever be involved in the defense of Taiwan.  However, rather 
than seek confrontation, Tokyo prefers a peaceful 
resolution of the Japan-Taiwan-China issue.91
3. Southeast Asia 
Relations between Japan and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began informally in 1973 
and were formalized in 1977.  The relations between ASEAN 
and Japan have predominantly been economic.  Some of the 
shared security interests between ASEAN and Japan include 
maritime safety against piracy and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) which provides for a multilateral security dialogue 
between Japan and the ASEAN countries.  In December 2003, 
Japan declared its intent to accede to the treaty of Amity 
and  Cooperation  in  Southeast  Asia  (TAC).  This  treaty  
 91 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 
2003. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap2-a.pdf>  
[4 August 2004], 37. 
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basically commits those states involved to respect the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
countries in the region.92
The fact that the security relations between Japan and 
the countries of ASEAN have only recently begun does not 
rule out the premise that the ASEAN countries would oppose 
Japan assuming a greater military role within the region.  
In the view of ASEAN, the value of a more assertive Japan 
would be to balance the growing power of China.   
Increasingly, Japan is regarded as a “balancer” in the 
region.  The historical legacy of Japanese imperialism in 
Southeast Asia is receding in the popular mind, as 
evidenced in a 1998 Southeast Asian public opinion poll, 
where the “overwhelming majority of the respondents saw 
Japan as a trustworthy partner that would not become a 
military threat”.93  So, within the context of Southeast 
Asia, Japan must tread a careful path between self-defense, 
balance of power, and security threat as per World War II.    
4. Russia  
The basic bilateral relationship between Japan and 
Russia revolves around geography and economics.  Since the 
mid-1700s, Japan and Russia advanced rival claims to the 
Kurile Islands.  The Japanese and Russian views of one 
another are based on this long history of competitive aims 
in the North Pacific and North Asia generally between the 
two countries. 
 92 Richard Hanson, “Japan, ASEAN celebrate 30-year relationship.” 
Asia Times Online, 13 December 2003. 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EL13Dh04.html> [4 August 2004]. 
93 Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. Strategic Asia 
2003-2004: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2003), 284. 
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Russo-Japanese trade relations are centered on 
Siberia.  Siberia has the potential to be a major supplier 
of energy for Japan.  Siberia has reserves of oil, natural 
gas, timber, coal, and ores that are necessary to Japan, a 
resource importer.  Between 1968 and 1981, Japan has 
developed six agreements with Russia relating to the 
development of Siberian natural resources.94   
Since 1963, Japan and Russia have utilized coastal 
trade as a means to supplement regular trade.  It is and 
remains a modest trade, but one which calls for maintaining 
a bilateral relationship that benefits both countries.95  
Included in the coastal trade is the fishing economy.  This 
is one of the oldest points of contact between the two 
countries.  Competition over access to fishing territories 
has existed for centuries.  Prior to World War II, Japan 
enjoyed fishing rights off the coast of Kamchatka.  These 
fishing territories were protected by the Imperial Japanese 
Navy.  After World War II, the Russians took control of 
this territory as well as Southern Sakhalin and the 
Southern Kuriles, which gave them an offshore economic zone 
of 100 miles.96  This put a damper on economic bilateral 
relations until the signing of a fisheries treaty in the 
late 1970’s. 
Overall, the Japanese – Russian economic bilateral 
relationship is much like that of Japan and China in that 
despite other on going bilateral problems the economic 
relationship tends to be ongoing and sustained. 
 94 Herbert J. Ellison, Japan and The Pacific Quadrille: The Major 
Powers in East Asia, (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1987), 143. 
95 Ibid, 142-143. 
96 Ibid, 143. 
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Japanese territorial claims have proven the Achilles 
heel of Russo-Japanese relations since the early 1950s.  In 
1956, the two countries signed a joint declaration to 
restore diplomatic relations.  They also agreed to continue 
negotiating for a peace treaty, although the normalization 
of diplomatic relations benefited Japan only marginally.97
These territorial issues tended to be a real divider 
when it came to political relations during the 1970’s.  
Although economic relations flourished, the political 
relations were obstructed because neither country was 
willing to alter their respective position with regards to 
territorial issues. 
In 1978, the signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty 
setback Russo-Japanese relations, because the Russians felt 
that Japan was taking a more overt anti-Russian stance.  
Relations between the two countries were degraded 
considerably because of this treaty, and remained that way 
through out the 1980’s.  Japan maintained that the 
normalization of relations between Russia and Japan could 
not, and would not, be conducted until Russia was willing 
to return the “Northern Territories”.98
More recent events such as the Ikurtsk Statement of 
2001, which reaffirms the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint 
Declaration, and the 1983 Tokyo Declaration, have seen both 
countries striving to settle the Northern territories issue 
in an effort to sign a peace treaty.99
 97 Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden, Japan: A Country Study, 
(Washington, D.C. : Federal Research Division, Library of Congress : 
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1992), 403-404. 
98Ibid, 405. 
99 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 
2003. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap2-a.pdf> [6 
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As far as North Korea is concerned Russia and Japan 
see eye to eye.  In February 2004, Russian Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Losyukov, stated: 
Russia and Japan are active and keen participants 
in the negotiating process on the questions of 
resolving the Korean situation. We have common 
objectives - the necessity to ensure the nuclear-
free status of this sub-region and to maintain 
the regime of security and nonproliferation 
there, as well as to achieve this by peaceful 
means.100
With regards to more general security issues, Losyukov 
pointed out that, “Russia and Japan belong among the 
leading states of this region.” They are continuing to 
cooperate within the international antiterrorist coalition.  
The two countries have established relations between their 
defense and security agencies.  Their goal is to maintain 
and strengthen the military-political stability of the 
Northeast Asia region.101
5. The Korean Peninsula 
Like other countries within the East Asian region 
North and South Korea share a common history with Japan.  
In 1910, Korea was annexed by Japan and remained under 
Japanese control until the end of World War II.  Korea was 
then divided, with the North befriended by the Soviet Union 
while the South fell into the orbit of the United States.  
This division of the peninsula has affected the security 
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100Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov’s 
Interview with ITAR-TASS News Agency on the Questions of Russian-







                    
relationships between the two Koreas as well as the 
security relationship between the Koreas, the Asian region, 
and the world. 
a. South Korea 
Within the East Asian region, Japan and South 
Korea hold similar views on issues dealing with security.  
Both countries have independent security relations with the 
United States and both view North Korea as a serious 
security issue.   
As with other nations in the East Asia region, 
Japan and South Korea are bound together economically.  
Japan is the second leading trading partner of South Korea.  
Because of the North Korean issue and China’s ever 
increasing economic and military power, it is essential 
that South Korea and Japan continue to increase their level 
of military cooperation in order to protect the economic 
relations between the two countries. 
Starting in 1994 South Korea and Japan began 
improving their military-to-military relations with South 
Korean naval ships visiting Japan. In 1995, Korea returned 
the hospitality to visiting JMSDF ships by having them 
visit Pusan.102  Further relations were developed in 1999 
when the two navies held their first combined exercises off 
the coast of Pusan.103  Though the two navies have had 
successful relations, thus far Japan is slow to allow its 
Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) to participate in any 
 102 Sang-Woo Rhee and Tae-Hyo Kim, ed., Korea-Japan Security 
Relations (Seoul: Oruem, 2000), 104. 
103 Shinobu Miyachi, “Korea-Japan military ties take the heat off US” 
Asia Times Online, 18 November 1999. < http://www.atimes.com/japan-
econ/AK18Dh02.html> [7 August 2004]. 
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combined exercise with South Korean forces due to Japan’s 
military history on Korean soil. 
Japan’s colonial legacy in Korea also color 
Seoul’s attitude to Japan’s increasing military role within 
the region and the world.  However, the 7 June 2004 
announcement by the United States that they are reducing 
the number of U.S. troops in South Korea may force Seoul to 
welcome a new, expanding military presence by Japan, as 
Japan is South Korea’s closest friendly neighbor when 
dealing with North Korea.  Perhaps the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from South Korea will provide the catalyst for a 
Japan-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. 
b. North Korea 
Relations between Japan and North Korea, 
especially as of late, have not been very successful.  
Japan views North Korea as its most probable threat within 
the East Asian region.  Normal relations, let alone 
security relations, between the two countries has been 
rough due to the unpredictability of North Korean behavior.  
Currently, six-way talks are underway to resolve the 
biggest issue concerning North Korea, which is the 
revitalization of its nuclear program.  Though this is not 
the only reason that relations between Japan and North 
Korea have been unsuccessful, there have been a series of 
recent events that have hampered Japanese-North Korean 
relations. 
On 31 August, 1998, North Korea launched a 
Taepodong-1 medium range ballistic missile which flew over 
Northern Japan and fell into the Pacific Ocean.  North 
Korea claimed that the missile was carrying a satellite 
which they had intended to put into orbit.  No information 
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has so far been collected from the North Korean 
“satellite”, nor has any Western tracking system been able 
to detect it in orbit.104  In response to this missile test, 
Japan suspended its food aid to North Korea and stated that 
it would resume the aid once North Korea took the 
appropriate steps to curb its development of ballistic 
missiles as well as its nuclear weapons program.105   
The second event is especially noteworthy because 
it marks the first time that the JMSDF has opened fire on a 
vessel for reasons other than self-defense.  On March 22, 
1999, two North Korean spy boats were detected in Japanese 
territorial waters.  The spy boats did not stop despite 
JMSDF destroyer warning shots from their 5 inch guns, and 
JMSDF P-3C Orions 150kg warning bombs dropped near the 
suspect boats.  The spy boats evaded pursuit from the JMSDF 
and returned to their homeport of Chongchin, North Korea.106
In December of 2001, a vessel similar to that of 
the spy boats was detected off the coast of Japan.  The 
Japanese Defense Agency ordered the Japanese Coast Guard to 
detain the vessel for questioning.  As in the second event, 
warning shots ignored.  Instead, the suspect vessel fired 
back.  This resulted in the subsequent sinking of the 
suspect vessel with all hands by the Japanese Coast Guard.  
In an effort to determine the origin of the boat, the 
Chinese  worked  in  conjunction  with  Japan  to raise and  
 104 “First Taepodong 1 Launch Carried A Satellite.” Jane’s Missiles 
and Rockets. 01-Oct-1998, EDITION: 1998, VOLUME/ISSUE: 002/010. 
105 “No capitulation, no food: Komura to Pyongyang.” The Japan Times, 
13 August 1999. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn19990813a4.htm > [9 August 2004]. 
106 Keizo Nabeshima, “In the wake of the spy boats.” The Japan Times, 
7 April 1999. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?eo19990407a2.htm> [9 August 2004].  
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salvage the boat.  Upon investigating the wreckage, all 
evidence has led to the probability of the boat being North 
Korean.107
The last issue that hinders relations between the 
two countries is the issue of the Japanese citizens 
abducted by the North Koreans.  During the 1970’s and early 
1980’s young Japanese were kidnapped by North Koreans to be 
used for teaching the Japanese language to North Korean 
spies.  It was not until September of 2002 that Kim Jong Il 
admitted to and apologized to the Japanese for the 
abductions.108  Kidnapping has joined the issue of North 
Korean nuclear weapons as the main topic of negotiation in 
the six party talks conducted in Beijing.109
As North Korea is closed and extremely 
unpredictable, it is difficult to determine what their 
reaction might be if Japan increased its security/military 
role in the East Asian region.   
On first glance, the North Koreans might think 
that, if Japan pulls out from under the United States 
security umbrella, Japan might want to strengthen regional 
relations, to include North Korea.  This would be good for 
North Korea because they would gain access to Japan’s 
economic might throughout the region.   
On the other hand, Japan could increase its 
threat evaluation of North Korea, and therefore increase 
 107 The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian 
Strategic Review 2002, (Tokyo: 2002), 331. 
108 Hans Greimel, “After quarter century, Japanese abductees return 
to Tokyo from North Korea” IDSnews.com, 16 October 2002. 
<http://www.idsnews.com/story.php?id=12315> [9 August 2004].  
109 “Japan, N Korea discuss kidnapped,” BBC News, 11 February 2004. < 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3478835.stm> [9 August 
2004]. 
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its military capabilities in the form of nuclear weapons to 
be able to deter a very unpredictable nuclear capable 
neighbor. 
D. SUMMARY 
In 1992, Japan made a major transitory move with 
regard to its defense policy. As a result, the country has 
enjoyed considerable praise and only mild criticism because 
of its reluctance to participate in globally-important 
military operations. History, however, makes it markedly 
evident that Japan entered into its 1992 decision, not 
because of global pressures or because of any major change 
of heart, but from an inherent belief that Japan must 
become engaged in the world to defend its interests.  That 
belief forms a central tenet of Japanese ideology, which 
had been suppressed during the post-World War II years. The 
Japanese people had became so accustomed to their post-1945 
pacifist theme that they convinced themselves that a policy 
of dependence on the United States for security was the 
only way for them to survive.  However, the changes that 
have occurred in the world during the past decade have 
forced Tokyo to revise its view on engagement with the 
outside world. 
As it would seem, the international criticism that 
some say led to Japan's ultimate decision in 1992, did have 
an effect on the country's subsequent defense policy.  
Japan did not decide to become active in U.N. Peacekeeping 
simply because the rest of the world wanted them to.  Japan 
became active because the rest of the world (particularly 
the United States) helped them realize that their current, 
but outdated, defense policy was not suited to the new age 
of international challenges. 
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With that in mind, there are a multitude of scenarios 
with and reactions from countries within the East Asian 
region that may arise in the future, should Japan continue 
its new engagement policies.  Japan’s future course depends 
on current issues such as the North Korean nuclear issue, 
the Global War on Terror, and Japan’s role in Humanitarian 
Assistance and Reconstruction in Iraq as well as other 
countries.  All of these factors are going to play a 
significant role in Japan’s continuing dilemma of just how 
involved they should become militarily within the East 






































V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Japan's imperial past that led directly to World War 
II in Asia has left a legacy of anti-militarism 
domestically as well as a severe distrust of Japan 
throughout the region.  This is a sticking point that is 
brought up continually in Japan's relations with other 
countries as well as within domestic politics.  This legacy 
along with civilian control of the military, the lack of 
which contributed immensely to Japan's march to war in the 
1930's, and the aversion to nuclear weapons was supposedly 
resolved with the process of post-war reconstruction, and 
the adoption of the "Peace Constitution".  However, these 
legacies of World War II were never set in stone, even 
during the period immediately following the war.  Rather, 
they were adjusted to fit the reality of Japan's security 
situation during the Cold War.  Now, with the rapidly 
evolving security geography in Asia, Japan appears poised 
to jettison principles that for six decades were considered 
the bedrock of Tokyo's security policy.   
Since the inception of the "Peace Constitution" in 
1947, Japan has gradually reinterpreted the wording of 
Article 9 to expand and restructure the JSDF from a police 
force to a credible military deterrent.  However, the 
"Peace Constitution," together with a robust U.S. military 
presence in the region, has allowed the JSDF to maintain a 
low profile.  Nor have the Japanese seriously considered 
their security requirements.   
It is evident today that Japan is seriously rethinking 
its defense commitments, to include the roles and missions 
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of the JSDF.  The JSDF is acquiring new technologies and 
capabilities.  While there is a growing acceptance of the 
JSDF within domestic politics, recent legislation allowed 
the JSDF to deploy to Iraq in support and reconstruction 
capacity.  There is even evidence of Tokyo's willingness to 
join in a TMD system.   
The legacies of the "Peace Constitution", civilian 
control of the military, and the aversion to nuclear 
weapons are slowly becoming a vision of the past as Japan 
begins its new military engagement policies.  The vision of 
the future for Japanese defense is being shaped by the 
emerging global security situation.  It is forcing Japan to 
develop plans to deal with new threats and diverse 
contingencies such as cyber, and NBC (nuclear, biological, 
chemical) attacks.  Japan is also taking positive and 
proactive steps to bring greater stability to the 
international security environment by participating in 
United Nations peacekeeping missions.  Hopefully, Japan 
will be able to meet these new emerging challenges in a 
manner that is acceptable to its regional neighbors.   
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Japan needs to emerge from under the security umbrella 
of the United States and become a military power 
commensurate with its economic power.  The best way for 
Japan to accomplish this is to maintain its economic, 
diplomatic, and military relations with its neighbors to 
reassure them that the imperialistic Japan of the past will 
not return.  It also needs to continue its interpretation 
of the "Peace Constitution" to the point of revising it to 
reflect the current international security environment.  No 
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matter what happens Japan will play a crucial role in the 
security of the East Asian region. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS 
The following are some proposed areas of research that 
have arisen out of the research conducted for this thesis.  
What would be the implications of Japan and the Asian-
Pacific region developing a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
system?  In light of the growing power of China, what form 
might future security alliances take in the Asian-Pacific 
region?  If the North Korean situation is not resolved, 
will Japan develop nuclear weapons?  Future research in 
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